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THE “ARGENTINE FRANCO”?: The Regime of
Juan Carlos Onganía and Its Ideological
Dialogue with Francoist Spain (1966–1970)
ABSTRACT: The article examines the ideological character of Juan Carlos Onganía’s dictatorship
by exploring its ties and dialogue with Francisco Franco’s Spain. Known as the “Argentine
Revolution,” Onganía’s regime (1966-70) was, the article shows, one of the first Cold War
Latin American dictatorship to overtly use Francoist ideology as its point of reference.
While building on the conventional wisdom that the legacies of the Spanish Civil War
informed right-wing thought in Latin America, the study then shifts its focus to Spain’s
1960s “economic miracle” and technocratic state model, observing them as a prominent
discursive toolkit for authoritarian Argentine intellectuals. Drawing on newly discovered
correspondence and archival sources, the article first excavates the intellectual networks
operating between Franco’s Spain and the Argentine right during the 1950s and 1960s. Once
handpicked by Onganía to design his regime, these Argentine Franco-sympathizers were to
decide the character of the Argentine Revolution. Second, the article sheds light on the intimate
collaboration between the two dictatorships, and further explores the reasons for Onganía’s
downfall. In doing so, the study adds to a burgeoning historiographic field that underscores the
significance of the Francoist dictatorship in the Latin American right-wing imaginary.
KEYWORDS: Juan Carlos Onganía, Francoism, The Argentine Revolution, Opus Dei,
Hispanidad
On October 21, 1966, Argentina’s new dictator, Juan Carlos Onganía,wrote a letter to Spain’s long-standing despot, Francisco Franco, tobe handed to him by Argentina’s education minister, Carlos María
Gelly y Obes, during a visit to Madrid. “The Argentine Revolution,” it read
[referring to the regime’s official name], “has emphasized in its founding
documents the singular value it attributes to the spiritual community with
Spain, and its willingness to translate this appreciation into concrete lines of its
I would like to thank professors Pablo Piccato, Nara Milanich, Caterina Pizzigoni, José Moya, Amy Chazkel, Alberto
Medina (Columbia University), and Federico Finchelstein (The New School for Social Research) and my peers at
Columbia University, Alfonso Salgado, Elizabeth Schwall, Marianne González, Sara Hidalgo, Paul Katz, Rachel
Newman, Fabiola Enríquez Flores, Andrei Guadarrama, and Mariana Katz for their advice and encouragement. I
would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of The Americas for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Last, I am grateful to the Social Science Research Council, the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the Minerva Stiftung, and
Prof. Stefan Rinke of the Free University of Berlin’s Institute for Latin American Studies for supporting the research
on which this article is based.
T H E A M E R I C A S
78:1/January 2021/89–117
© THE AUTHOR(S), 2021. PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
ON BEHALF OF ACADEMY OF AMERICAN FRANCISCAN HISTORY. THIS IS AN OPEN ACCESS ARTICLE, DISTRIBUTED UNDER
THE TERMS OF THE CREATIVE COMMONS ATTRIBUTION LICENCE (HTTP://CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG/LICENSES/BY/4.0/),
WHICH PERMITS UNRESTRICTED RE-USE, DISTRIBUTION, AND REPRODUCTION IN ANY MEDIUM, PROVIDED
THE ORIGINAL WORK IS PROPERLY CITED.
doi:10.1017/tam.2020.106
89
foreign policy.” Next, Onganía declared Argentina’s “adhesion” to a Spain-based
international education institute, the Office of Ibero-American Education (OEI).
“We believe that this initiative will contribute to the orientation of our youth
according to the spiritual tradition that has guided our nation’s creation,” he
clarified. Last, and suggestively, Onganía stated that to constitute a “richer
plot” in Spanish-Argentine relations, “the Spiritual requires the support of the
Economic and Political,” and that the two countries’ “intimate position” in the
international arena “must crystalize . . . in an ever-closer collaboration in these
fields.”1 In his four years in power, Onganía approached no other foreign
leader in such adulation, that we know of.
This article explores the ideological dialogue between Onganía’s dictatorship and
the late Francoist regime (also known as the “Segundo Franquismo”). That
Onganía had betrayed Francoist sympathies has been a recurrent observation of
his close followers throughout the years.2 Operating between 1966 and 1970,
his regime was, this article further argues, one of the first South American Cold
War regimes to celebratedly link itself with the Spanish dictatorship.
Nevertheless, I do not seek simply to classify Onganía as Franco’s impersonator
but rather to contextualize his authoritarian brand against the background of
Argentina’s fraught democratic experiment of the 1940s and 1950s, and,
equally important, its troubled economic modernization of the 1960s. By
exploring who Onganía and his followers were, and by examining the nature of
their linkages with Franco’s Spain, the article sheds light on the political myths
undergirding Onganía’s conservative modernity. In so doing, it lays bare the
European-Latin American networks propelling Latin America’s authoritarian
turn of the 1960s at large.
Throughout the Cold War (c. 1946-91), Latin America witnessed its newly born
democratic order giving place to a host of military dictatorships that strove to
jettison parliamentarism and, more often than not, the Enlightenment’s
legacies entirely. Understood as an embryo for communist takeovers,
democracy became, in fact, unpopular during the 1960s, not only among
military leaders but within large swaths of Latin America’s elites and middle
classes. Indeed, political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell notably used Onganía’s
regime as a case study for “bureaucratic authoritarianism,” understood as the
moment when Latin America’s oligarchies, frustrated from the masses’ political
1. J214: Información, October 21, 1966, Archivo General de la Nación, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de
Prensa y Difusión, Partes de Prensa [hereafter AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp], box 102.
2. Nicanor Costa Méndez, oral history with Robert Potash, 1986–1987, Robert Potash Papers (FS 020), Special
Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries [hereafter Robert Potash Papers], 14;
Mariano Grondona, oral history with Robert Potash, 1986–1987, Robert Potash Papers, 8; Historians have referred to
Onganía as the “Argentine Franco.” See Alain Rouquié, Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina (Buenos Aires:
Emece, 1984), 259.
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power, embraced military dictatorships that fostered pro-market economic
policies.3 This article takes issue with some aspects of this scholarly legacy.
Onganía and his ideologues, it argues, had a more ambitious program than
merely boosting economic growth: namely, the institution of a post-fascist
modernity in Argentina, marked by strict social hierarchies, an authoritarian
model of collective action, and a salient Catholic-moralist project.
Of course, they were not the first to do so. Cold War Latin America, historians
have shown us, was rife with political movements aiming to transcend both
communism and liberalism. This first became clear in the late 1940s, as
democratically elected populists such as Juan Perón and Getúlio Vargas
championed a “third position,” characterized by “vertically conducted”
politics and economic state intervention.4 Soon thereafter, Latin America saw
the emergence of pro-market dictatorships that, while allying with the
Western Bloc in the struggle against communism, also defied the
liberal-democratic ethos. Typically, they entertained instead the idea of
inaugurating novel modes of civil representation that, at first glance, fall
under the category of what political scientist António Costa Pinto labels
“political corporatism.”5 The Argentine Revolution belonged to the latter
trend. Still, Onganía was not a fascist, and there was hardly any form of
corporatism, much less bureaucracy, in his policies. In effect, he and his
followers presented themselves as modernizers who sought to transcend
Perón’s statism and benefit from the economic order set out in Bretton
Woods in 1944, that is, as those who would finally liberate Argentina from
post-fascist populism.6
Thus, this analysis makes the case that the Argentine Revolution was Argentina’s
second post-fascist moment, akin to what scholars have recently defined as
“Hispanic technocracy” and analogous to historian Benjamin Cowan’s concept
3. Guillermo O’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 1–39. On these regimes’ ideologies, see Hector E. Schamis, From
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism: Reassessing the Military Regimes of the Southern Cone (New York:
Columbia University, ILAS, 1988); and Thomas Davies and Brian Loveman, The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in
Latin America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978).
4. Federico Finchelstein “Corporatism, Dictatorship, and Populism in Argentina,” in Authoritarianism and
Corporatism in Europe and Latin America: Crossing Borders, António Costa Pinto and Federico Finchelstein, eds.
(New York: Routledge, 2019), 247.
5. Political corporatism, explains Costa, is a “political representation . . . in which organic units (families, local
powers, professional associations and interest organizations and institutions) replace the individual-centered electoral
model of representation.” Costa Pinto, Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe (New York: Routledge,
2017), 5.
6. On the rise of the global economic order after 1945, see Kamran Dadkhah, The Evolution of Macroeconomic
Theory and Policy (New York: Springer, 2009), 29–44; Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance:
From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window:
Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
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of “moral technocracy.”7 However, while it is tempting to apply Cowan’s
terminology to Onganía by deeming him an anticommunist “Cold Warrior,” the
picture might be more complicated. As the following pages will illustrate,
Onganía was a conscious actor in the Cold War who nonetheless framed his
worldview in response to its two contenders’ modernizing projects.8 Hence, the
article also aligns with historian Marcelo Casals’s recent call to complicate the
“hemispheric narrative” according to which the Latin American right obeyed US
foreign policy trends and followed its anticommunist doctrines.9 How Onganía’s
authoritarian experiment unfolded owes much to the two fundamental fantasies
underpinning its emergence. First, he and his followers believed that Argentina
needed a dramatic modernizing phase so as not to be dominated by the Cold
War powers—an endeavor that could be attained only by replacing democracy
with an authoritarian Leviathan and a team of pro-market technocrats.10 Second,
as its name implies, this dictatorship was not to be a temporary phase but a final
“Revolution” against modern ideologies as such. As far as Onganía’s pipe dreams
went, this alternative modernity within Western society’s realms could be realized
peacefully—as the collective effort of a nation that would opt to substitute
mass-based politics for material abundance and western secularism for a
restoration of its supposed pre-modern spiritual harmony.
It was within the context of this worldview that Franco’s Spain loomed large.
Leaving behind its traumatic Civil War legacies and having replaced its
fascist-autarchic economic model for market-based development, the Spain of
the 1960s could justly propagate itself internationally as a country that had
“changed its skin.”11 Years before Brazil and Chile could boast similar
economic achievements, Franco’s so-called “economic miracle” had already
proven that a dictatorship could benefit economically from opening itself to
global markets without being dependent on Western powers or compromising
its alleged spiritual essence, let alone its austere social and patriarchal
hierarchies. Consequently, Francoism served as a source of legitimation and a
discursive toolkit for Latin American dictators who rose to power in historical
7. Antonio Cañellas Mas, La tecnocracia hispánica. Ideas y proyecto político en Europa y América (Gijón, Asturias: Trea,
2016); Benjamin A. Cowan, Securing Sex: Morality and Repression in the Making of Cold War Brazil (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 111–144.
8. He was thus one of those who, in historian Odd Arne Westad’s words, “framed their own political agendas in
conscious response to the two models of development presented by [the Cold War’s] two contenders.” See Arne
Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 3.
9. Marcelo Casals, “Which Borders Have Not Yet Been Crossed? A Supplement to Gilbert Joseph’s
Historiographical Balance of the Latin American Cold War,” Cold War History 20:4 (May 18, 2020): 4.
10. For a theorization of technocracy in Latin America, see Eduardo Dargent, Technocracy and Democracy in Latin
America: The Experts Running Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1–19.
11. On this discourse, see Tatjana Pavlovic, The Mobile Nation: España Cambia de Piel (1954–1964) (Chicago:
Intellect, 2011).
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contexts rather different from Spanish fascism, within the framework of what
historian Tanya Harmer has defined as America’s “inter-American Cold War.”
True, in this “multisided contest between regional proponents of communism
and capitalism,” by the 1960s, there was little leeway for anti-US “third
paths.”12 Even so, Onganía’s links with Francoism disclose a conscious
motivation to flex the Cold War’s ideological dichotomy. Moving
chronologically, this article will first touch on how the Francoist regime
propagated itself to its Latin American right-wing interlocutors during the
1960s. Next, it will analyze Argentina’s political crisis of the early 1960s and
elaborate on the intellectual networks that operated between Spain and the
Argentine right—and decided the character of Onganía’s regime. Thereafter, I
will illustrate how, once in power, Onganía collaborated with Franco in
multiple fields, ranging from building on Spain’s development plans and
education system to economic and diplomatic collaboration. Last, I will
account for the downfall of the Argentine Revolution, in the wake of Onganía’s
failure to fully follow Franco’s footsteps.
THE FRANCOIST STATE MODEL, AND THE REGIME’S
RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA (1939-66)
In recent years, historians have begun excavating the nexus between the
dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1936-75) and Latin America’s right-wing
regimes, highlighting, among other things, the centrality of the Spanish Civil
War in Latin American right-wing historical consciousness.13 The present
article builds on this literature but also sets out to broaden our understanding
of the Latin American right’s fascination with Francoism by shifting the
attention from the legacies of the Civil War toward the original conservative
modernity that Francoism exhibited during the 1960s. True, throughout its
four decades of existence, Franco’s Spain never ceased to promote itself
triumphantly as Christian civilization’s paramount anticommunist bastion.
Furthermore, in the 1940s, Franco concealed neither his neo-imperial
aspirations in Latin America nor his will to extend Spain’s anti-modern
“Crusade” to its progeny.14 After all, America, stated the Francoists, “begins at
12. Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2011), 1.
13. See for example Kirsten Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical
Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile,” Hispanic American Historical Review 98:1 (2018): 77–115; Kirsten Weld,
“The Other Door: Spain and the Guatemalan Counter-Revolution, 1944–54,” Journal of Latin American Studies 51:2
(May 2019): 307–331; and Isabel Jara Hinojosa, De Franco a Pinochet. El proyecto cultural franquista en Chile 1936–
1980 (Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, 2006).
14. Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, Imperio de papel. Acción cultural y política durante el Primer Franquismo
(Madrid: CSIC, 1992); Manuel Espadas Burgos, Franquismo y política exterior (Madrid: Rialp, 1988); Rosa María Pardo
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the Pyrenean Mountains.”15 Still, to fully understand Onganía’s motivations for
associating with Franco’s idiosyncratic regime, a closer look at the political myths
the latter championed during the years of the “Spanish miracle” is due.
That Francoism was an anomaly in the Cold War’s ideological panorama is not
only a regular scholarly assessment but was the regime’s own conspicuous
public narrative. Franco and his followers believed their country to be
“different”—a proud alternative to the “materialist” Cold War blocs.16 Not
surprisingly, Spain was thus a hotbed of multiple far-right associations, many of
which branched out to Latin America. Until the mid 1940s, Spain’s hegemonic
ideological group was the filo-fascist party Falange (FET). Taking its cue from
Italian fascism, Falangism defined itself in terms of a totalitarian
“national-syndicalist” revolution.17 After 1945, however, the regime abandoned
its initial fascist proclivities, returning instead to a more Catholic and
traditionalist ideological core.18 A clear indication of this was Spain’s return to
the discourse of Hispanidad—an anti-modern neologism born in the 1920s
through Spanish-Argentine collaboration—that advocated the restoration of the
alleged political and spiritual harmony of the Spanish empire.19 As I have
explained elsewhere, Franco’s Institute for Hispanic Culture (ICH) served as
the central apparatus whereby Spanish and Latin American intellectuals jointly
propagated this ideology.20 With the zealous propagandist Alfredo Sánchez
Bella at its helm, and consisting of copious branches, journals, and annual
congresses, the ICH in the 1950s thus blatantly posited a joint Latin American
Sanz, ¡Con Franco hacia el imperio! La política exterior española en América Latina, 1939–1945 (Madrid: UNED, 1995);
Javier Tusell, La España de Franco. El poder, la oposición y la política exterior durante el Franquismo (Madrid: Historia 16,
1989).
15. See Informe reservado presentado por Alfredo Sánchez Bella tras su viaje porHispanoamérica, ArchivoGeneral
Universidad de Navarra [hereafter AGUN], doc. 15/102/6; and Archivo General de la Administración [hereafter AGA],
box 82/11114.
16. Justin Crumbaugh, Destination Dictatorship: The Spectacle of Spain’s Tourist Boom and the Reinvention of
Difference (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 76–86.
17. The Falange held offices in Latin America until 1945, but thereafter diminished considerably as an international
apparatus. On the Falange, see José Luis Jerez Riesco, Voluntad de imperio. La Falange en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Nueva
República, 2007); Joan María Thomàs, La Falange de Franco. Fascismo y fascistización en el régimen Franquista, 1937–1945
(Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2001); Ismael Saz Campos, Fascismo y Franquismo (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2004);
and Álvaro de Diego, José Luis Arrese o la Falange de Franco (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 2001).
18. On this transformation, see Javier Tusell, Franco y los católicos. La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957
(Madrid: Alianza, 1984); Carme Molinero and Pere Ysás, La anatomía del Franquismo. De la supervivencia a la agonía,
1945–1977 (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008), 9–35; and Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in
Twentieth-Century Spain (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 105–126.
19. Coined in Argentina by the Spanish-born priest Zacarías de Vizcarra in 1926, the term Hispanidad was
adopted by the Spanish thinker Ramiro de Maeztu, who brought it to optimal levels of publicity during the years of
Spain’s Second Republic. See Ramiro de Maeztu, Defensa de la Hispanidad (Buenos Aires: Editorial Poblet, 1941). For
a recent discussion on the meaning of Hispanidad, see Ilan Stavans and Iván Jaksic, What Is La Hispanidad?: A
Conversation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011). See also Marisa González de Oleaga, El doble juego de la
Hispanidad. España y la Argentina durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Madrid: UNED, 2001).
20. Daniel Gunnar Kressel. “The Hispanic Community of Nations: The Spanish-Argentine Nexus and the
Imagining of a Hispanic Cold War Bloc,” Cahiers des Amériques latines 79 (December 2015): 115–33.
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anticommunist and anti-US mobilization. In fact, it even sought to constitute a
“Hispanic bloc” that would defy the Cold War power structure.21
Other prominent, if unofficial, institutions linking Spain with the Americas in the
late 1950s were the Catholic societies Opus Dei (“The Work of God”) and
Cursillos de Cristiandad (“Short Courses in Christianity”). While the former
proposed to Catholic laymen a method of “sanctification in everyday life
through ordinary work,” the latter advocated the Christian man’s
evangelization through a system of retreats designed to lead one to an “intimate
and personal friendship” with Christ.22 Beyond this mysticism, these
associations’ importance stemmed from their flair for rallying conservative
elites toward reactionary political action.23 Established in Spain against the
backdrop of the Spanish Civil War, and recognized by the Vatican as a Secular
Institution in 1947, the Opus Dei, in particular, would become immensely
influential in Latin America as an intellectual apparatus operating by way of
soft power. Or, as Álvaro de Portillo, the Opus Dei’s secretary-general,
explained it to Franco: “The external action of our members has been directed,
primarily, to the intellectual field. We seek to work . . . always through discreet
and quiet personal intervention, which we consider the most effective.”24
Ideologically, the Opus Dei proclaimed a sophisticated post-fascist state
ideology—a “middle-of-the-road” solution between the Falange’s “fascist
totalitarianism” and the “lame democracy” of the West.25 While anti-modern in
its ideological underpinnings, it nevertheless took pride in its alleged aptitude
for assimilating modern technical knowledge into the Hispanic domain. In the
words of Opus Dei ideologue Florentino Pérez Embid, this protected cultural
sphere was to be “European in means, but Spanish in the ends.”26
21. See also Antonio Cañellas Mas, Alfredo Sánchez Bella. Un embajador entre las Américas y Europa. Diplomacia y
política informativa en la España de Franco (Gijón: Ediciones Trea, 2015).
22. This was how the Opus Dei first appeared in the Spanish press. See “El primer instituto secular de la Iglesia,”
ABC (Madrid), March 15, 1947, 7; and Clemente Sánchez and Francisco Suárez,Cursillos de Cristiandad abiertos al futuro
(Madrid: Euramérica S.A., 1971), 10.
23. The two movements relied heavily on Jesuit theology, but also sought to transcend it. See Oscar H. Wast,
Jesuítas, Opus Dei, Cursillos de Cristiandad (Mexico City: Editorial Luz, 1971). The Cursillos’ “leaders’ manual” from
1964 vowed to attract the “best people from each locality so that once these were well trained, they, being the ferment
of Christianity, would elevate and transform the masses.” See Juan Hervás, Leaders’ Manual for Cursillos in Christianity
(Madrid: Euramerica, 1964), 29–30.
24. 1952, Julio 14: el Opus Dei por mediación del procurador general D. Álvaro del Portillo, Fundación Nacional
Francisco Franco [hereafter FNFF], doc. 10868. On the Opus Dei, see Jesús Ynfante, La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei.
Génesis y desarollo de la Santa Mafia (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1970); Daniel Artigues, El Opus Dei en España: 1928–1962
(Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1971); Alberto Moncada, Historia oral del Opus Dei (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 1987); and Joan
Estruch, Saints and Schemers: Opus Dei and Its Paradoxes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
25. Rafael Calvo Serer, Teoría de la restauración (Madrid: Rialp, 1956), 106. In the 1960s, the Falange and Opus
Dei emerged as two distinctive ideological schools, struggling bitterly for hegemony in the Francoist political arena. See
Stanley G. Payne, Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 431–468.
26. Florentino Pérez-Embid, Ambiciones españolas (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1953), 12.
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Opportunistic as ever, Franco ultimately recognized in the Opus Dei a capacity to
direct his dictatorship’s adaptation to ColdWar circumstances. In 1957, following
a period of economic crisis deriving from the regime’s semi-autarchic economic
model, he replaced his Falange leadership with a team of Opus Dei
administrators, later to be nicknamed the “technocrats.” Operating under the
auspice of Franco’s powerful deputy, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, figures such
as Laureano López Rodó were granted the liberty to alter Spain’s economy as
they saw fit. In turn, Spain’s 1959 stabilization plan, comprised drastic
administrative reforms and a host of “economic rationalization” measures
ranging from slushing subsidized industries to a steep currency devaluation.
Later (1964-75), López Rodó was the designer of Spain’s development plans,
which, building on French and Italian precedents, included further economic
simulation methods, such as industrial development poles.27 Subsequently,
with the flow of investments from the United States and other Western
European nations, Spain underwent a decade of rapid industrialization, thereby
reaching levels of economic growth rarely seen before in Europe. Immediately
narrated by the regime as the “Spanish miracle”—and despite harrowing social
consequences such as high unemployment, migration, and dislocation of entire
communities—these accomplishments would resonate in Latin America
throughout the 1960s.28
Strikingly, 1960s Spain showcased not merely a model for development but the
realization of the Opus Dei’s theory of the state. As the designers of Franco’s
two constitutional reforms of 1958 and 1967, López Rodó, and even more so
Opus Dei sympathizer Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, succeeded in reducing
the influence of the Falange’s “national-syndicalist” ideology to a minimum, all
the while defining Spain as an “organic democracy” committed to a unique
form of public representation through “intermediary societies,” namely “family,
guild, and municipality.”29 However, with Franco’s corporatist chamber (the
Cortes) detached from executive, legislative, or judicial power, one should
consider these maxims as political theatre rather than a representation system.30
27. On López Rodó’s ideological inspirations, see Antonio Cañellas Mas, Laureano López Rodó. Biografía política de
un ministro de Franco (1920–1980) (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011). See also Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, El
pensamiento político de la derecha española en el siglo XX (Madrid: Tecnos, 2005), 338–339.
28. This narrative appeared in Waldo de Mier’s propaganda book España cambia de piel, from 1964. See Mier,
España cambia de piel (Nuevo viaje por la “España del Milagro”) (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1964). On the Spanish
economic miracle and its consequences, see Sima Lieberman, Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy: 1940–1993
(New York: Routledge, 2005); Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco’s Spain, 1939–
1975 (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Andreu Mayayo, Economía Franquista y corrupción (Barcelona: Flor del
Viento, 2010); and Julio Gil Pecharromán, Con permiso de la autoridad. La España de Franco (1939–1975) (Madrid:
Temas de Hoy, 2008).
29. The first was Spain’s May 1958 Principles of the National Movement Law; the second was the January 1967
Organic Law of the State. See “Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional,” Boletín Oficial del Estado 119 (Madrid), May
19, 1958, 4511-4512; and “Ley Orgánica del Estado,” Boletín Oficial del Estado 9, January 11, 1967, 466–477.
30. On Franco’s way of “faking politics,” see Cazorla Sánchez, Fear and Progress, 49–56.
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In actuality, at least until the late 1960s, Spain’s technocracy was characterized by a
swift deregulatory process, orchestrated by an administrative control center in the
hands of spiritually oriented technicians. This so-called “directing elite”—
synonymous with the Opus Dei—was the de facto group navigating the
regime’s overhaul.31 Tellingly, by 1965 these intellectuals portrayed Spain as a
society that had transcended ideologies via consumption, that is, a country
whose citizens had been freed from politics, and, as such, having achieved a final
condition of social peace and spiritual perfection.32
This ideological makeover also signaled the ushering in of a new era in Spain’s
international relations. In the global spirit of the Détente, Franco gradually
softened his bellicose anticommunist rhetoric, allowing Spain’s cooperation
with the Eastern Bloc, Castro’s Cuba, and Allende’s Chile.33 This
notwithstanding, Franco’s Spain never ceased backing Latin America’s far-right
affiliations and dictators.34 More important, it now captivated the imagination
of Latin America’s right in more complex ways, as it exemplified how a
traditionalist dictatorship could maintain symbiotic relationships with the
Western Bloc while preserving its alleged Hispanic “physiognomy and
character,” in López Rodó’s words.35 For Onganía, rather than Spain’s Civil
War legacies, this unique “change of skin,” and the putative mentality change it
had in store for the working classes, were the crucial lessons to be learned from
Franco’s authoritarian development.
ARGENTINA POST-PERÓN AND THE ADVENT OF THE
ARGENTINE REVOLUTION (1955–66)
Unlike many Latin American military dictatorships, the Onganiato emanated not
from the threat of communism—be it real or illusory—but from the
overwhelming grip of the Peronist movement on Argentine politics. Ever since
September 1955, when Juan Perón was ousted from the presidency and sent to
exile, Argentina had exhibited a restricted parliamentary democracy in perpetual
31. In the words of one Opus Dei intellectual, the operation of this “élite politique” means that a few selected
individuals direct all public affairs while the rest of the population “grazes like a flock of sheep.” See Andrés Vázquez
de Prada, “Don Quijote, caballero político,” Nuestro Tiempo 15 (Madrid), September 1955, 4–5.
32. Fernández de la Mora’s book El crepúsculo de las ideologías, from 1965, presented Francoism as a land of experts,
consumption, and leisure. See Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, El crepúsculo de las ideologías (Madrid: Rialp, 1965). López
Rodó’s texts likewise displayed a comprehensive technocratic theory of state and society. See Laureano López Rodó,
Política y desarrollo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1970); and López Rodó, Nuevo horizonte del desarrollo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1972).
33. Celestino del Arenal, Política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1994), 29–
68; María José Henríquez Uzal, ¡Viva la verdadera amistad!: Franco y Allende, 1970–1973 (Santiago de Chile: Editorial
Universitaria, 2014).
34. Franco’s material assistance to the Chilean right is a case in point. See Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the
Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness,” 103–108; and Memorandum sobre Chile, FNFF, doc. 14870.
35. López Rodó, Nuevo horizonte del desarrollo, 32–33.
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turmoil, the result of Peronists’ control of Argentina’s main labor unions and
electoral system. This state of affairs hindered the country’s integration into
global financial markets, causing uneven economic performance, which, in turn,
further marred the image of democracy in the eyes of the anti-Peronist elites and
middle classes.36 Ultimately, this political impasse provided the incentive for
Argentina’s armed forces and conservative sectors to join forces in configuring a
regime that would quell parliamentary politics infinitely.
A grave indication of Argentina’s descent toward authoritarianism occurred on
March 29, 1962, when commanders of the armed forces overthrew elected
president Arturo Frondizi for letting Peronist candidates partake in Argentina’s
municipal elections. Shortly afterward, the public became privy to two epithets
that represented opposing sides of an ideological struggle within the armed
forces: the Colorados (“reds”) and the Azules (“blues”). Whereas the former
aimed to purge Argentina from Peronism through the extensive operation of a
“revolutionary” military dictatorship, the latter was a self-proclaimed “legalist”
faction, and as such, sought more sophisticated ways to do away with Perón’s
dominance.37 The Azules’ emergent leader, Juan Carlos Onganía, held that the
armed forces should intervene in politics only when necessary to defend the
country from falling into the hands of a populist “criminal regime.”38 Born in
1914, and serving as a soldier during the military interventions of the 1930s,
Onganía also believed that generals did not have the skills to govern and should
let experts manage the executive branch.39 Following two deadly showdowns, in
September 1962 and April 1963, Onganía’s faction overpowered the Colorados,
thereby paving the way for its control over the democratic process and an ever
more restricted democracy.40
Simultaneously, the political crisis further stimulated the activity of Argentina’s
antidemocratic right. Self-branded the “nacionalistas,” Argentina’s unique fascist
36. Mónica Peralta-Ramos, The Political Economy of Argentina: Power and Class since 1930 (Boulder, CO:Westview
Press, 1992); Roberto Cortés Conde, The Political Economy of Argentina in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 194–243; Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class,
1946–1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); James W. McGuire, Peronism without Perón: Unions,
Parties, and Democracy in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Carlos Altamirano, Bajo el signo de las
masas (1943–1973) (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 2001), 50–69.
37. According to Alain Rouquié, the Azules “identified with the ruling classes, the oligarchy of the owners of the
land and builders of the country.” See Rouquié, Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina, 214.
38. Onganía was the initiator of the Campo deMayo Communique No. 150 that pledged to prevent Perón’s return
to power. See Juan Carlos Onganía, oral history with Robert Potash, 1984. Robert Potash Papers; and Robert Potash, The
Army & Politics in Argentina, 1962–1973: From Frondizi’s Fall to the Peronist Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1996), 73.
39. On Onganía’s alleged “obsession” to keep the military out of politics, see Tomás Sánchez de Bustamante, oral
history with Robert A. Potash, 1985, Robert Potash Papers, 7.
40. Marvin Goldwert,Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930–1966: An Interpretation (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2014), 188–203; Rodolfo Pandolfi, Azules y Colorados. El conflicto político y militar a comienzos de
los sesenta (Buenos Aires: Editorial Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, 1994).
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movement led this trend, as it had done since the 1930s.41 Not by coincidence, the
nacionalistas had also been Franco’s main partners in the attempt to lead Latin
America’s “Hispanic” counterrevolution. In particular, in the 1950s, the amity
between Alfredo Sánchez Bella and the nacionalista Mario Amadeo set the
contours for the dialogue between the dictatorships in the 1960s.42 The early
1960s saw the nacionalistas splintering into two ideological schools. On one
hand, they acted from a violent neofascism that demanded to replace democracy
with an anti-imperial corporatist-totalitarian regime and that often dovetailed
with the fringes of the Peronist movement.43 Here one can include anyone from
intellectuals such as Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo and Julio Meinvielle to
paramilitary bands such as the Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara.44 On the other
hand, other nacionalistas began rejecting the fascist legacies of the 1930s,
pursuing instead collaborations with transnational organizations such as Ciudad
Católica, Movimiento Familiar Cristiano, Cursillos de Cristiandad, and the Opus
Dei, all of which offered more sophisticated approaches to authoritarian political
action.45 Amadeo spearheaded this clique and was the key promoter of a
market-friendly authoritarian “synthesis.”46 His post-fascist ideological position
was clarified further when, in 1960, he met Franco in Madrid, later to express
his disappointment at the latter’s “anachronistic” corporatist jargon.47 Rather
than the neofascists, it was this new ideological spectrum that drew the attention
of the Azul faction. Indeed, Onganía himself participated in the Cursillos de
Cristiandad’s retreats.48 Given the secrecy surrounding these ceremonies, it is
41. Several historians have studied this movement throughout the years. See Fernando Devoto, Nacionalismo,
fascismo y tradicionalismo en la Argentina moderna. Una historia (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno de Argentina, 2002);
Federico Finchelstein, Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919–1945
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Alberto Spektorowski, The Origins of Argentina’s Revolution of the Right
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003); and David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist
Movement, Its History, and Its Impact (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
42. During the 1950s, Amadeo and such nacionalistas as Juan Carlos Goyeneche, Máximo Etchecopar, and José
María de Estrada were among the most important promoters of the Hispanidad ideology in Latin America. See Mario
Amadeo, Por una convivencia internacional. Bases para una comunidad hispánica de naciones (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica,
1956), 218.
43. For more on the nacionalistas’ “Peronization,” see Daniel Lvovich, El nacionalismo de derecha. Desde sus orígenes
a Tacuara (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2006), 76–77.
44. On the paramilitary neofascists, see Leonardo Senkman, “The Right and Civilian Regimes, 1955–1976,” in
The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present, Sandra McGee Deutsch & Ronald
H. Dolkart, eds. (Wilmington, DE: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993),126–130.
45. On Ciudad Católica and the Movimiento Familiar Cristiano, see Elena Scirica, “Visión religiosa y acción
política. El caso de Ciudad Católica – Verbo en la Argentina de los años sesenta,” PROHAL Monográfico, Revista del
Programa de Historia de América Latina 2 (2010): 33–36; and Isabela Cosse, “¿Una teología de la familia para el
pueblo latinoamericano? La radicalización del Movimiento Familiar Cristiano en Argentina (1968–1974),”
Iberoamericana 18:68 (2018): 57–75.
46. Mario Amadeo, Frente a los hechos. Conferencia pronunciada en el Teatro Cómico, el 20 de agosto de 1956, Biblioteca
Nacional Argentina, Archivo Que [hereafter BNA-ARCH-CEN-ARQué], Mario Amadeo folder. See also Cosme Beccar
Varela, El nacionalismo (Buenos Aires: Tradición, Familia y Propiedad, 1970), 15.
47. Mario Amadeo to Alfredo Sánchez Bella, April 2, 1960, AGUN, doc. 15/35/219.
48. The retreats consisted of three days of liturgical seminars (or “rollos”) and exercises in obedience, including one
in which the participants’ free will was broken by being coerced to imitate the posture of the Crucifix, whereby they
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difficult to infer whether he underwent a considerable ideological radicalization as a
result. It is beyond doubt, however, that to his followersOnganía expressed not only
pride in being a “cursillista” but a determination to deploy functionaries from
among the Cursillos circles.49
Following Frondizi’s downfall in 1962, Amadeo founded a colloquium named
Ateneo de la República (Athenaeum of the Republic). Led by eminent ICH
members and Franco sympathizers, it aimed to coordinate Argentina’s
authoritarian turn, a fact that Amadeo addressed openly at the association’s
inauguration.50 The Ateneo featured a younger generation of technocratic
theorists, many of whom were Amadeo’s protégés and intimately associated with
Franco’s Spain.51 Mario Díaz Colodrero, Mariano Montemayor, and Enrique
Pelzer, for instance, studied together in Madrid under Sánchez Bella.52 Other
examples were Nicanor Costa Méndez, Jorge Mazzinghi, and Samuel Medrano,
all of whom studied at the ICH and were to reach high-ranking positions in
Onganía’s regime.53 Likewise, Díaz Colodrero, Mazzinghi, and Medrano joined
the Opus Dei in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, there was a recurring pattern in
these men’s biographies, starting with a Francoist ideological education and
ending with a distinctive form of political activism in the 1960s.54 Indeed, the
Ateneo served as a nexus with Franco’s Spain, as its intellectuals were the
founders and directors of the Buenos Aires ICH branch, which opened in
November 1965 in the presence of Franco’s ICH director, Gregorio Marañón
Moya.55 As for the contact between Onganía and the Ateneo, by 1963, they
were already collaborating in a short-lived attempt to form a conservative
“national front” ahead of that year’s July 7 general elections.56 This meant that
discovered “the joy experienced on finding oneself like Christ on the Cross.” See Hervás, Leaders’ Manual for Cursillos in
Christianity, 54.
49. Mariano Grondona claimed that Onganía was “greatly influenced by the Cursillos de la Cristiandad” but did
not quite elaborate in what sense. See Grondona, oral history with Potash, 19.
50. “Por una solución nacional. Discurso pronunciado en la comida del Ateneo de la República, el 21 de diciembre
1962,” Cuadernos del Ateneo de la Republica 2 (Buenos Aires), BNA-ARCH-CEN-ARQué, Mario Amadeo folder. The
Ateneo’s other leading figures were Hispanistas such as Máximo Etchecopar, Santiago de Estrada, Eduardo Roca, and
Basilio Serrano. Author interview with Enrique Pelzer, March 15, 2016.
51. Mario Amadeo to Alfredo Sánchez Bella, November 1, 1966, AGUN, doc. 15/35/264.
52. Sánchez Bella even wrote to the Argentine ambassador on their behalf. See Alfredo Sánchez Bella to Perdo
Radío, February 2, 1949, Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Culto [hereafter AMAEC], Embajada en
Madrid II, box 25; and Interview with Enrique Pelzer, March 15, 2016.
53. Interview with Enrique Pelzer.
54. In 1965, these men all arrived in Madrid as the official guests of the ICH. See JorgeMazzinghi,Ni memorias ni
olvido (Buenos Aires: El Autor, 2015), 104.
55. Mazzinghi was one of the branch’s first directors, while Amadeo, Díaz Colodrero, and José Mariano Astigueta
were among the boardmembers. Additionally, the ICHmaintained intimate contacts with the Spanish embassy, as Spain’s
ambassador, JoséMaría Alfaro, and his cultural attaché José Ignacio Ramos as well, served as board members. See Instituto
Argentino de Cultura Hispánica. Veinticinco años de labor cultural (Buenos Aires: Cultura Hispánica, 1990), 12–13.
56. Costa Méndez, oral history with Potash, 3–4. See also “Frente: ¿Llegó el momento de elegir candidatos?”
Primera Plana (Buenos Aires), April 2, 1963, 6.
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the interim administration of prime minister José María Guido witnessed the
presence of several Ateneo members, most prominently José Mariano Astigueta,
Guido’s minister of education.57
With the Peronist electorate casting blank ballots, Arturo Umberto Illia’s
center-left party, Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo, won the 1963 elections with
only 25 percent of the popular vote.58 Illia’s lack of a majority in parliament
and his efforts to reduce the Azul faction’s power meant further political
uncertainty. As a result, the Argentine media now saw a mounting number of
publicists openly discussing replacing democracy with a civil dictatorship.
Salient within this panoply of voices was Mariano Grondona, who, in the
popular magazine Primera Plana, stressed that “a refined Roman-styled
dictatorship” was not only legitimate but mandatory.59 “Everyone, myself
included, contributed to creating a kind of myth about Onganía,” he would
admit later.60 Likewise, Mariano Montemayor, by now a columnist in the
magazine Confirmado, proclaimed that Argentina was ready to “cross the
Rubicon, leaving behind its fictitious legitimacies and incompetent
management.”61
The Opus Dei, for its part, launched a journal named Cuadernos del Sur, which
was later to become Onganía’s ideological mouthpiece.62 A brainchild of Opus
Dei priests José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois and Ernesto García Alesanco—both of
whom had been Pérez Embid’s apprentices in Spain—the Opus Dei’s
technocratic theories appeared here in their purest form.63 Parliamentarism
(or “ideological political life”), these intellectuals argued, is “a theoretical
fabrication” that is “divorced from reality” and for which Latin America “pays a
high price.”64 The future, they asserted, demands a regime “undoubtedly
57. That Guido appointed his authoritarian education minister reluctantly can be inferred from the way he
ultimately sacked him. “You do not seem to share [my] way of directing this process, and even express what seems like
a lack of positive conduct leading to a deterioration of the electoral process,” Guido wrote to Astigueta. See Texto de la
carta enviada por el presidente de la nación al Dr. JoséMaríano Astigueta, June 25, 1963, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, box 97.
58. Following the banning of his front’s candidate, Perón called his followers to cast blank ballots. Twenty-one
percent of the population did so. See Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, 76–81. Illia, a physician from Córdoba
province, was neither unfit politically, nor did he lead Argentina into economic crisis. If anything, the opposite is the
case: a tenuous economic growth characterized his tenure. See Rodolfo Pandolfi, La democracia derrotada. Arturo Illia y
su época (Buenos Aires: Lumiere, 2008), 1–12.
59. Mariano Grondona, “La dictadura,” Primera Plana, May 31, 1966, 11.
60. Grondona, oral history with Robert Potash, 1986, Robert Potash Papers, 36.
61. Mariano Montemayor, “Al: El señor presidente,” Confirmado 26 (Buenos Aires), October 23, 1965, 5.
62. Onganía’s ministers wrote in Cuadernos del Sur regularly, and in the case of Díaz Colodrero, even served on the
board of directors. The same goes for Eugenio Brusa, the journal’s editor, a member of bothOpusDei and the Ateneowho
in 1968 became head of the political department at the Ministry of the Interior. See “Opus Dei/Ateneo,” Inédito 49
(Buenos Aires), August 7, 1968, 5.
63. In 1964, Ibáñez Langlois wrote to Pérez Embid to discuss the journal’s ideological line, See JoséMiguel Ibáñez
Langlois to Florentino Pérez Embid, AGUN, box 003/016. Ibáñez Langlois, a Chilean, maintains that the journal was
primarily an Argentine project. Author interview with José Miguel Ibañaez Langlois, April 25, 2016.
64. Ernesto García Alesanco, “En defensa de la libertad,” Cuadernos del Sur 10 (Buenos Aires), May 1965, 382.
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authoritarian, albeit not despotic, that renounces the formal values of democracy
but preserves its essential content.”65 To be sure, this regimewas not to rest on the
expertise of specialists alone. To avoid provoking the proletariat to alienation and
rebelliousness, it would deploy religious experts (“spiritual force”) to instruct the
workers how to “use the tools of power and technology without collective
self-destruction,” Ibáñez Langlois explained.66
The more the popularity of Illia withered, in the face of disappointing economic
performances, the more clearly Onganía, then his chief of staff, emerged as
Argentina’s actual leader.67 Not only did Onganía not bother denying this, but
he also refused to pledge allegiance to his president, when on August 6, 1964,
in a speech at West Point, he vowed to defend Argentina from “political parties
circumstantially in power” and from “exotic ideologies.”68 Seeking to attain
international recognition, in 1965, Onganía also toured Europe and Brazil.
Tellingly, he opened this trip with a week-long visit to Franco’s Spain, where he
encountered several high-ranking figures, most importantly Franco’s vice
president, Agustín Muñoz Grandes. Later, Onganía would admit not only that
he was profoundly impressed by his host but also that he had told Muñoz
Grandes that “Spain is the essence of Argentina’s interior and exterior
politics.”69 To the local press, Onganía underscored his alleged Basque ancestry
and demanded that the Argentine, Spanish, and Brazilian armed forces form an
anticommunist alliance, indicating once more who he saw as his foremost
ideological allies.70
On November 22, 1965, Illia ostensibly forced Onganía into retirement.71 In
turn, in January 1966, Onganía met with Amadeo and his men—a fateful
encounter in which the dictatorship’s configuration took place.72 Amadeo was
65. José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “El futuro de la revolución social,” Cuadernos del Sur 15, October 1965, 898.
66. José Miguel Ibáñez Langlois, “Planificación y libertad,” Cuadernos del Sur 6-7, January-February 1965, 16.
Ibáñez Langlois alluded here to the Opus Dei’s methods of attaining “enjoyment through work.” How this was to be
exercised on a national scale he did not say. If anything, his words should be considered a principal guideline for the
establishment of a spiritualist technocracy in Latin America.
67. A person who wanted to talk about issues of power, Díaz Colodrero reflected, “wasted time not speaking with
Onganía.” In Mario Díaz Colodrero, oral history with Robert Potash, 1986. Robert Potash Papers, 4. On this process, see
Liliana de Riz, La política en suspenso, 1966–1976 (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2000), 30–42.
68. “Sin ninguna fe en el gobierno,” Primera Plana, June 1965, 12; “Palabras pronunciadas por el comandante en
jefe del ejercito el día 6 de agosto en West Point en oportunidad de realizarse la Conferencia de los Ejércitos Americanos,”
Boletín Público de la Secretaría de Guerra (September 10, 1964).
69. Audiencia presidida por el presidente de la Nación Argentina, General Onganía y el comisario del Plan de
Desarrollo Económico y Social, don Laureano López Rodó, August 19, 1966, AGUN, doc. 005/397/22.
70. “Los ejércitos de Argentina y Brasil estarán unidos frente a cualquier acción comunista,” ABC (Seville),
September 2, 1965, 23. See also “Un nuevo Onganía,” Primera Plana, September 21, 1965, 10.
71. According to Potash, while Illia appointed brigadier general Eduardo Castro Sánchez—an officer senior to
Onganía—as secretary of the army, thereby provoking Onganía’s resignation, he did not deliberately cause his
departure. See Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, 151.
72. Díaz Colodrero, oral history with Potash, 7.
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the “person who spoke,” promoting the idea “that a coup was necessary” and that
this government “of mediocracies” should be replaced by “capable men,” Costa
Méndez recalled.73 His memory matches what Amadeo wrote to Sánchez Bella
at the time: “I believe that the Ateneo can fulfill a great role of nucleation and
civil orientation in the uncertain times ahead,” he told his Francoist ally.74 Put
differently, when laying the foundations for his regime, Onganía sought out the
expertise of the Ateneo’s Hispanophile technocrats over that of neofascist
figures such as Sánchez Sorondo—whose journal Azul y Blanco Onganía even
closed in later years.75 As significantly, Onganía’s ideological references were
evident to his followers. “Onganía’s ideal was Franco, but he realized quite well
that Argentina was not Spain and that Franco was anachronistic,” Costa
Méndez remembered.76 In other words, to his men, Onganía was candid about
his Francoist inspirations but also purported to push the Spanish model and
move toward a somewhat different authoritarian format—one that would
overcome Perón’s mass-based movement by spurring swift economic growth,
in “peace and liberty.”77
THE ARGENTINE REVOLUTION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
(1966-69)
On June 28, 1966, generals Pascual Pistarini, Adolfo Álvarez, and BenignoVarela,
overthrew Arturo Illia in a bloodless coup d’état. The following day they granted
complete extra-constitutional powers to Onganía. Therefore, technically Onganía
did not seize power militarily, which allowed him to present himself as a civil
administrator who answered neither to a military Junta nor to any political
group. Still, Onganía’s regime was, by all standards, a dictatorship. Little did
this bother the mainstream Argentine press, which could barely hide its
enthusiasm in expectation for economic stagnation to be replaced with decisive
action.78 On August 5, 1966, the famous exiled Spanish philosopher Salvador
de Madariaga even published an open letter to Onganía in the daily La Prensa,
declaring that democracy did not suit the “Hispanic character.” A liberal
thinker, but evidently no big democrat, Madariaga then mused about a new
73. Costa Méndez, oral history with Potash, 3–10.
74. Mario Amadeo to Alfredo Sánchez Bella, December 30, 1965, AGUN, doc. 15/35/260.
75. On this journal, see Valeria Galván, El nacionalismo de derecha en la Argentina posperonista. El semanario Azul y
Blanco (1956–1969 ) (Rosario: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2013).
76. Costa Méndez, oral history with Potash, 8.
77. Mario Díaz Colodrero, Dos políticas, dos argentinas. Palabras pronunciadas por el Secretario de Gobierno de la
Nación, Dr. Mario Díaz Colodrero por la red de radio y televisión, el 15 de marzo 1968 (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Estado
de Gobierno, 1968), 10.
78. “Exigencias de la vida actual,” La Nación (Buenos Aires) July 1, 1966, 6; “Política educativa, para nuestro
tiempo,” La Nación, July 14, 1966, 6.
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post-ideological society wherein “both the employers’ anarchy and the workers’
anarchy will be replaced with a regime of authority.”79
No sooner had Onganía come to power than he began linking himself with the
Francoist regime. On July 13, 1966, he published a text titled “Políticas del
Gobierno Nacional” pledging to “strengthen Argentina’s traditional relations
with Spain and the other European nations.”80 Further efforts to establish a
bond between the regimes ensued when in August 1966 Laureano López Rodó
arrived in Buenos Aires to meet with Onganía and his cabinet.81 López Rodó’s
memorandum indicates that Onganía was full of pathos when speaking about
Spain’s role in Argentina. “Nations need more than just material progress. They
require the spirit to inspire them. Here they need Argentinidad. Spain must give
this spirit its form,” he told Franco’s technocrat.82 Even more striking, López
Rodó’s minutes depict Onganía expressing “his interest in the Spanish formula
of the Economic and Social Development Plan,” and suggesting sending officials
to Spain to “study the Argentine problems with the Spanish experts.” To further
impress his guest, Onganía voiced technocratic slogans of his own. The future
“participation of the community” in politics was hazardous, he said, given that
Argentina’s political parties are “divorced from reality.”83
Several weeks later, Onganía wrote his previously mentioned letter to Franco, in
which he explained his regime to his peer, and in so doing, to his followers. This
can be deduced from yet another suggestive line in his letter: “I am convinced that
Your Excellency will interpret the meaning of this message, dictated by the desire
. . . that the substantive values that have givenmeaning to our national movements
would translate into the effective action of our governments.”Here, Onganía was
alluding to the sacred values of Hispanidad and Catholicism that, in his view, were
the ethical backbone of the Argentine Revolution.84
Regardless of these gestures, there is no evidence that Onganía ever publicly
pledged to walk in Franco’s footsteps, or that the Argentine mainstream press
seriously considered their connection.85 In truth, one could notice distinct
79. Salvador de Madariaga, “Carta abierta al general-presidente,” La Prensa (Buenos Aires), August 5, 1966, 1.
80. Políticas del Gobierno Nacional, AGN.DAI/PN.SPD.pp, box 101.
81. López Rodó stated that Onganía “had been so affectionate with Spain, he esteems our country so much, that I
was really excited about this meeting.” SeeDeclaraciones del ministro sin cartera del plan de desarrollo económico social de
España Dr. Laureano López Rodó luego de su entrevista con el presidente de la nación, August 19, 1966, AGN.DAI/
PN.SPD.pp, box 101.
82. Audiencia presidida por el presidente de la Nación Argentina, August 19, 1966.
83. Audiencia presidida por el presidente de la Nación Argentina, August 19, 1966. See also Laureano López
Rodó, Memorias (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1990), 68–69.
84. J214: Información, October 21, 1966.
85. MarianoGrondona did ponder whether Onganía should walk in the footsteps of French, Spanish, and Brazilian
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differences between the leaders’ styles. For one, Onganía did not instate a cult of
personality around himself by referring to his authority as stemming from the
“Grace of God,” as Franco had done.86 For another, despite relying on sporadic
police brutality—most famously during oppressive actions at the University of
Buenos Aires, the Argentine right’s bête noire—Onganía refrained from
systematically terrorizing his opponents, let alone assassinating them.87 In fact,
he saw himself as embodying a consensual “state of exception,” which by
outlawing all political activity—which he perceived as a voluntary
“renunciation” of an entire “political generation”—aimed to avoid civil war at
all costs.88 Moreover, by permitting the uninterrupted function of Argentina’s
labor unions and free press, Onganía could contend that his regime protected,
rather than eliminated, civil liberties.89 Or, as his supporters in the press
explained, given that the Argentines’ “fundamental human rights” remained in
place, Onganía’s regime was entirely “not despotic.”90
Thus, the Spanish-Argentine ideological link was, at least initially, discreet. It
became more explicit, however, once Onganía began appointing his officials.
By making Costa Méndez foreign minister, and Díaz Colodrero secretary of
government, Onganía proved that Amadeo’s circle was the regime’s ideological
powerhouse. Echoing López Rodó’s function, Díaz Colodrero, the Opus Dei
affiliate and Cuadernos del Sur editorial board member, was to be the regime’s
chief administrator, bringing together all branches of government toward rapid
economic development.91 The government fully stabilized in January 1967,
when Onganía appointed Adalbert Krieger Vasena as minister of the economy,
along with the Ateneo’s own José Mariano Astigueta as minister of education
and Guillermo Borda as minister of the interior. For Amadeo, these
November 1, 1966, 14. Similarly, a Primera Plana editorial noted that for Onganía the “Spanish experience after 1939 is
not disposable,” but nonetheless did not link the two dictatorships. See “Una nube de incógnitas,” Primera Plana, July 5,
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87. In what came to be known as “the night of the long batons,” on July 29, 1966, the federal police stormed the
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Aires: Emece, 2007), 85–146.
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10–11.
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90. Mariano Grondona, “Definiciones,” Primera Plana, July 5, 1966, 11.
91. “The State Secretariat was to take over everything that had to do with executive action from the Interior
Ministry,” he said. See Díaz Colodrero, oral history with Potash, 8.
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appointments confirmed that Onganía had made the Ateneo his regime’s
hegemonic ideological core. “The revolutionary government, because of its
political, social, and spiritual orientation, could not have found a more suitable
and coherent team in the civil sphere than ours,” he bragged to Sánchez
Bella.92 Moreover, Onganía appointed numerous functionaries with “spiritual”
credentials, almost all affiliated with Opus Dei, Cursillos de Cristiandad, and
the ICH—apparatuses intimately linked with Spain, as we have seen.93
The exceptional figure in this cabinet was Krieger Vasena. While not a devout
Catholic, he and his team of economic “technicians” were chosen to administer
what was, in essence, a process identical to Franco’s 1959 stabilization plan.
Through a series of drastic practices, ranging from a currency devaluation to a
national salary freeze, Krieger Vasena sought to curb Argentina’s chronic
inflation, paving the way for a rapid increase of foreign investment.94 This
economic shock treatment also meant eliminating collective bargaining and
subsidized economic activities, most infamously the sugar industry in Tucumán
province.95 Believing that only an authoritarian regime could orchestrate so
profound a shift in the economy, Krieger Vasena actually believed that the
working classes would willingly endure a “state of mind of austerity” for
better-paying jobs and “modernized manufacturing.”96
In a parallel vein, Argentina was to undergo its own “decentralization” process,
based on a system of “development poles.”97 In the words of Díaz Colodrero,
its architect, this plan sought to “correct the concentrated growth distortion in
the metropolitan area.”98 That these formulas emulated Spain’s development
plans was a fact he admitted proudly.99 All things considered, the outcome of
92. Mario Amadeo to Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 28, 1967, AGUN, doc. 15/35/266.
93. On these figures’ affiliations, see Gabriela Gomes, “Las trayectorias políticas de los funcionarios
nacional-corporativistas del Onganiato,” in Trayectorias de intelectuales en el estado. Actas de jornadas de discusión,
Gabriela Gomes and Martín Vicente, eds. (San Fernando [Argentina]: Edición de la autora, 2016), 33–57.
94. As in France and Spain, the plan consisted of “one big devaluation,” thereby achieving currency stabilization.
See Adelbert Krieger Vasena, oral history with Robert Potash, 1984. Robert Potash Papers, 43.
95. Roberto Pucci, Historia de la destrucción de una provincia: Tucumán, 1966 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Pago
Chico, 2007); Silvia Nassif, “La lucha obrera en Tucumán. Del ingenio Los Ralos a la fábrica Textil Escalada (1966–
1973),” Coordenadas: Revista de Historia Local y Regional 3:1 (2016): 30–52.
96. Krieger Vasena, oral history with Potash, 57–58. For more on Krieger Vasena’s notions of “the role of
international capital markets” in Latin America, see Adalbert Krieger Vasena and Javier Pazos, Latin America; A
Broader World Role (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), 131–147.
97. “Discurso pronunciado por el Dr.Mario Díaz Colodrero el 16 deMayo 1968 en la unión industrial Argentina,”
Cinco discursos y una revolución (Buenos Aires: Publicaciones Movimiento Humanista de Derecho, 1968), 33–34.
98. Díaz Colodrero, Dos políticas, dos argentinas, 32.
99. “Argentina necesita grandes contingentes de mano de obra latina y especialmente española,” La Vanguardia
(Barcelona) June 14, 1967, 56. On Argentina’s development poles, see Patricio Narodowski, La Argentina pasiva.
Desarrollo, subjetividad, instituciones, más allá de la modernidad. El desarrollo visto desde el margen de una periferia, de un
país dependiente (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros Editorial, 2007); and Martín Fiszbein, “Crecimiento desbalanceado y
estructura productiva desequilibrada en Argentina (1945–1976). Problemas e ideas del modelo industrial en
retrospectiva,” Estudios sobre la Industria Argentina 3:3 (2013): 49.
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Onganía’s economic reforms was not dissimilar from that of the Francoist
precedent: between 1967 and 1970, Argentina witnessed a period of economic
stabilization and impressive GDP growth—for Krieger Vasena, this was the
“Argentine miracle.”100 However, the social consequences of these policies were
undeniably severe. As even Onganía admitted then, his “Plan of Ordering and
Transformation” hurt the more “humble sectors” of society.101
Throughout this process, a discussion burgeoned inside the regime regarding
the precise authoritarian state model that should replace Argentina’s
parliamentary system. This deliberation, too, included an intimate dialogue
between Amadeo (by then, Argentina’s ambassador in Brazil) and his
Francoist counterpart, Sánchez Bella. “We are in an extremely critical
moment for the implementation of a democratic and representative system,”
Amadeo wrote to Sánchez Bella, “based, not on political parties . . . but
natural institutions.”102 As expected, Franco’s ideologue backed these
formulas and defined them further for his friend: the Argentine dictatorship
“should rely on natural institutions—the family, municipality, and unions—to
create a politics of things, pragmatic rather than ideological,” he told Amadeo.
Even more striking, Sánchez Bella addressed the Ateneo’s specific role.
“What is important is that the Ateneo does not dissolve now that it is in
power . . . but succeed creating a new mentality in Argentina, more
appropriate than the present one for the technological society in which we
live,” he urged.103 Assuredly, for these men, the Ateneo symbolized how civil
representation was to be practiced, in actuality, in the age of authoritarian
technocracy. Rather than a fascist-styled corporatist chamber, participation in
executive power in Onganía’s Argentina would be exercised via elite societies
—those the dictator regarded as the most technically and spiritually adept for
the job, to be precise.
At first, the regime maintained its political plans undisclosed. Sure enough, from
the start, Onganía’s speeches were replete with anti-modern slogans. For instance,
on July 4, 1966, commemorating the 150 years since Argentina’s Declaration of
Independence, he affirmed that “a cycle in Argentine history has now reached its
100. Krieger Vasena, oral history with Potash, 57–58. On this period of economic growth, see Cortés Conde, The
Political Economy of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, 230–240.
101. Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía, en el acto de
clausura de la Primera Junta de Gobernadores de la Patagonia (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 1967). On the
winners and losers of these reforms, see Rubén M. Perina, Onganía, Levingston, Lanusse. Los militares en la política
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983), 131–151.
102. Alfredo Sánchez Bella to Mario Amadeo, September 20, 1966, AGUN, doc. 15/35/263.
103. Alfredo Sánchez Bella to Mario Amadeo, February 22, 1967, AGUN, document 15/35/268. Italics in the
original text.
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conclusion.”104 Even so, during his first months in power, Argentina’s political
future was hardly addressed. In May 1967, when Díaz Colodrero finally tackled
the question, all he would say was that Argentina should enjoy the current
“rest-cure” from its political “anachronisms.”105 Unfortunately for Onganía,
this vagueness meant that throughout 1967 his leadership came under
increasing public criticism.106 Subsequently, and with the Peronist labor unions
still cooperating with the regime, he made public an evolutionary strategy
consisting of “economic,” “social,” and “political” phases.107 If the “economic
phase” was synonymous with Krieger Vasena’s reforms, then the last “political
phase” was intended to signify the advent of an original and yet-to-be-defined
model of political representation, based not on a “party system” but a new
“concept of community.”108
Most enigmatic of the three phases was, however, the “social phase.”As Amadeo
and Sánchez Bella’s correspondence lays bare, it signified a resolve to alter the
Argentines’ “mentalities” toward obedient and integrated collective action.
Naturally, public morality was one prominent concern of the “social phase.” A
new patriarchal civic code, followed by restrictions on cultural expression and
municipal laws banning miniskirts and preventing men from growing long
hair, showcased a regime railing against the alleged detriments of the Western
cultural revolution of the 1960s—a process that, in a way, preceded the
Brazilian dictatorship’s “moral technocracy” period.109 With the youth’s
mentality now at the center of attention, the education system became a stage
for moralist theorization, and an arena in which the collaboration with
Franco’s Spain became ever more apparent. Following the passing of Law
16,981 of October 14, 1966, as Onganía had promised Franco, Argentina
began an intimate partnership with Spain’s Office of Ibero-American
104. Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la Nación teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida de la
camaradería de las fuerzas armadas, July 6, 1966, AGN, PN.SPD.pp, box 101.
105. “Gobierno: el plan político,” Primera Plana, May 23, 1967, 12–13.
106. While the liberal magazine Inédito condemned him for being a “fascist,” the neofascists harshly attacked
Krieger Vasena’s economic policies. See “Plagio?” Inédito, January 25, 1967, 2; “Si se va Onganía . . . ” Azul y Blanco,
October 23, 1967.
107. On the Peronist unions and the reasons for their collaboration with Onganía, see Darío Dawyd, “El nuevo
autoritarismo burocrático y el sindicalismo peronista. Análisis de la ‘participación’ junto al gobierno militar de Onganía
en la Argentina de los años sesenta,” Confluenze 4:2 (January 2013): 17; James, Resistance and Integration, 215–228.
108. Discurso pronunciado por el Señor presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía en la
comida de camaradería de las Fuerzas Armadas realizada el 6 de julio de 1967.
109. Cowan, Securing Sex, 111–144; There is little to show that the two dictatorships influenced one another when
formulating these policies. Still, the collaboration between Brazil and Argentina throughout the late 1960s should indeed
be explored further in historiography. Onganía’s Civic Code allowed Argentines to divorce but conditioned this on the
verdict of special “judicial decree” (Art. 66), and further granted any “relatives of the future spouses within the second
degree of consanguinity” the right to oppose new matrimonies (Art. 21). See Boletín Oficial del Estado 21554 (Buenos
Aires), November 4, 1968. For more on Onganía’s “Cinema Law,” see Ley 17.741, Boletín Oficial del Estado 21.550,
October 28, 1968. For more on these public morality campaigns, see Rouquié, Poder militar y sociedad política en la
Argentina, 259; and Mala Htun, Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships
and Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 67.
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Education.110 Education minister Gelly y Obes’s speech at the OEI headquarters
clarified what this bond meant for him and his leader: “Spain is once again our
example, as an expression of a strong and prolific nation; it is reborn from its
crises with new vigor and impulse,” he asserted, thereafter to avow that “Spanish
America’s spiritual cohesion is enhanced by having as a contemporary example
the means of development performed by the Mother Nation.”111
In 1967, Argentina even hosted the OEI’s Conference of Technical Education, an
occasion that featured Onganía and his newly appointed education minister
Astigueta yoking economic development to technical education and “respect to
order and spiritual and moral values.”112 Shortly afterward, Astigueta
promulgated an education reform that set out, among other things, to rid the
youth of nonconformity, or in his words, encourage it to “return to
interiority.”113 In what was the regime’s most salient indoctrination effort to
date, he deployed a think-tank of Catholic intellectuals to restructure the
Argentine secular education system according to Catholic guidelines. Tellingly,
a celebratory Cuadernos del Sur issue dedicated to the reform saw Spanish
thinker Víctor García Hoz, perhaps the Opus Dei’s most illustrious pedagogue
of the 1960s, presenting the introductory message. One can elude modern
alienation and rebelliousness, he stated, by “stimulating man’s spiritual
development so that he does not become a mere means of production,” and by
inspiring in him the “divine calling to work.”114 It is still unclear how these
words translated into concrete policy, given that the reform ended in 1969, as
we shall see shortly. What is certain, however, is that for Onganía and his
followers the “social phase” was tantamount to gradually indoctrinating the
Argentines to Catholic morality and obedience.115
By that time, the affinity between Spain and Argentina had begun revealing itself
in other realms. For one thing, the regimes made outstanding efforts to grant one
110. The OEI financed and directed the Argentine “middle school” reform, implemented in the province of
Buenos Aires and in place until 1971. See OEI, balance de actividades 1964-68, Biblioteca del Ministerio de
Educación, OEI/SG/IMF.15.
111. “Incorporación de la Argentina en la OEI,” Plana 110 (Madrid), October-November 1966, 3.
112. II seminario iberoamericano de enseñanzas técnicas (Buenos Aires: Oficina de Educación Iberoamericana)
September 14, 1967, 10–15.
113. Mensaje a la juventud. Discurso pronunciado por el Secretario de Estado de Cultura y Educación, Dr. José
Mariano Astigueta, durante el homenaje a los congresales de Tucumán, July 8, 1968 (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de
Estado de Cultura y Educación, 1968).
114. Víctor García Hoz, “La problemática perspectiva de la educación actual,” Cuadernos del Sur 42-43,
January-February 1968, 5–11.
115. Formore on Catholicization of the Argentine education system during the reform and the opposition to it, see
Laura Rodríguez, “La reforma educativa del gobierno de Juan Carlos Onganía. Adhesiones y resistencia,” in Política y
cultura durante el “Onganiato.” Nuevas perspectivas para la investigación de la presidencia de Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–
1970), Valeria Galván and Florencia Osuna, eds. (Rosario: Prohistoria, 2014), 157–176.
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another their highest of honors.116 Furthermore, following the closing of the
British market to Argentine beef in 1967, Spain was the first to come to
Onganía’s aid by purchasing some 20,000 tons of Argentine meat, in what
seemed a reverse version of the famous 1946 Perón-Franco treaties.117 The
Argentine Revolution also attracted the attention of Franco’s intellectuals. In
1967, Fernández de la Mora visited the country, presenting his theory on the
“twilight of ideologies” to a sympathetic audience.118 Another visitor from
Spain, although not a Spaniard himself, was Fredrick D. Wilhelmsen. A
reactionary Opus Dei sympathizer, in 1967 he gave a series of lectures in
Buenos Aires that drew the contempt of the liberal newspaper Inédito. The
“opusdeísta Wilhelmsen,” it reported, “spoke at the Ateneo de la República, in
parishes, and Catholic universities . . . all these new promoters of
communitarianism, cursillismo, corporativism, names behind which
clericalism and extreme right-wing fascism are hidden.”119 Regardless of its
alarmist tone (“fascism”), and despite failing to highlight the
Argentine-Spanish nexus, the report was nonetheless correct in pointing to
the antidemocratic ideological project that had been flourishing openly in
Argentina. Yet another instance was an event that took place at the Buenos
Aires ICH branch: in May 1968, it witnessed further public
Argentine-Spanish cooperation in the shape of a Congress for Scientific,
Cultural, and Economic Development. Once more, Spain’s ICH director
Marañon Moya, Onganía, and Costa Méndez attended this festive event and
pledged to educate Latin American youth to “have the ability to ask questions
about the worlds of matter and spirit.”120
In a parallel vein, Onganía’s ministers traveled to Spain, issuing telling statements
regarding their mission. InNovember 1967, as a part of an effort to amass foreign
credit in Europe, Krieger Vasena arrived in Spain.121 Accompanied by a team of
experts, he purported to explore “Spain’s system of administrative
decentralization,” which, the Spanish dailies explained, had already been
116. In 1967, Franco decorated Onganía and Costa Méndez with the Spanish Navy Medals of Honor. In return,
Onganía honored three Spanish ministers, most tellingly López Rodó himself. No German, French, Brazilian, British,
Mexican, or US official received any such honors from Onganía. See Decreto 7999/1967, Boletín Oficial del Estado
21306, November 3, 1967; and Decreto 1319/1970, Boletín Oficial del Estado 21964, July 6, 1970.
117. “Firmóse un acuerdo de carnes con España,” La Nación, August 6, 1967, 1. On this crisis, see Roberto Roth,
Los años de Onganía. Relato de un testigo (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Campana, 1981), 240–241. On the Perón-Franco
treaties that saved the Francoist regime in the 1940s, see Raanan Rein, The Franco-Perón Alliance: Relations between Spain
and Argentina, 1946–1955 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
118. “Conferencia de Fernández de la Mora en Buenos Aires,” ABC (Madrid), September 24, 1967, 93.
119. “La banca del señor Palanca o la palanca del señor Labanca,” Inédito, September 27, 1967, 3.
120. Desarrollo. Publicación del Congreso para el Desarrollo Científico, Cultural y Económico de Iberoamérica 1,
September 1968, 13.
121. According to Spanish news agencies, Spain’s banks granted Argentina “up to twenty million dollars” in loans.
See FNFF, doc. 20159.
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applied “as an initial experiment in the Argentine province of Córdoba.”122 Next,
Argentina’s minister of tourism and the press, Federico Frischmacht, arrived to
study Spain’s tourist economy. “I must admit that I feel overwhelmed by the
weight of trying to emulate the actions developed by the Spanish Ministry of
Information and Tourism,” he stated. The encounter with Spain’s model of a
“free press” brought Frischmacht to other revealing conclusions. “The one
concept necessary to guide the politics of governments and private activity is
Christianity,” he said, in yet another repudiation of Argentina’s bygone
parliamentary past. Then, he begged God “to continue enlightening” Franco
and Onganía, “who have done so much to lead our peoples together in the
path of historical destiny.”123
Last, Costa Méndez visited Spain in April 1969. Meeting with Franco, the
Argentine foreign minister discussed the similarities between the British
occupations of Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands, and the “need for the
respective governments to continue to lend each other mutual and unyielding
diplomatic support until they have obtained due justice.” He, too, could barely
reign in the impulse of declaring himself and his hosts the guardians of Latin
America’s “Hispanic truth.”124 In short, when visiting Spain, Onganía’s
ministers sought to obtain financial and diplomatic assistance, as well as to
study the Francoist methods of development, representation, and tourist
economy. And they did so while voicing pathos-laden expressions on the shared
“Hispanic” crusade their regimes supposedly spearheaded.
ONGANÍA’S “POLITICAL PHASE” AND THE REGIME’S DEMISE
(1969-70)
In 1968, as the Argentine Revolution neared its third year, the “political phase”
was still undefined, leaving the press to constant speculation.125 Even the
regime’s supporters in Cuadernos del Sur appeared perplexed when
contemplating Argentina’s future “organic” democracy, and whether it could be
rendered “corporatist.” For Edmundo Carbone, the journal’s editor, there was
little doubt that Argentina had transcended its ideological past and was ready
122. “El ministro argentino de economía esperado hoy en Madrid,” ABC (Seville), November 12, 1967, 66;
Among them was the Argentine minister of social security, Alfredo Manuel Cousido. For more on the
Argentine-Spanish Social Security treaty, see Boletín Oficial del Estado 269, November 10, 1967, 15513-15515.
123. (Document without title) AGA, box 42/08973, 4.
124. “La verdad hispana ha de ser divulgada por nosotros dijo el canciller argentino,” ABC (Madrid), April 15,
1969, 29.
125. “Argentina: ¿Empezó el tiempo político?” Primera Plana, January 30, 1968, 32; “Gobierno: la ilusión del
consejalismo,” Primera Plana, August 20, 1968, 20; “Participacionismo: ¿una mala palabra?” 7 Días (Buenos Aires),
August 12, 1968, 19.
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for an authoritarian model, based not on corporatist chambers but rather on
councils consisting of “representatives from different sectors of society
extracted from their freely constituted groupings.”126 Another Opus Dei
publicist named Roberto Bosca, on the other hand, spoke of a “democratic
corporative system” that would be “neither fascist nor medieval” and thus
capable of “alleviating the errors . . . of liberalism, neoliberalism, and
statism.”127 In the spring of 1968, further public confusion ensued as Borda
and Díaz Colodrero were both quoted as supporting the replacement of
parliament with an entirely novel system of representation.128
Unlike his intellectuals, Onganía was neither keen to elucidate his “political phase”
nor to frame it legally the way Franco had done in 1958 and 1967. Alternatively, he
set in motion minor projects that seemingly promoted public participation in
governance. The Ministry of Social Welfare, for instance, sponsored the
Promotion of Community Assistance (SEPAC) as a cornerstone of “social
participation.”129 Apart from this, for Onganía, the only vital civil councils were
the National Security Council (CONASE) and the National Council of
Development (CONADE).130 Procrastination along the route to the “political
phase” was an invitation to the regime’s local echelons to take further initiative.
In one such “pilot” project, in August 1968, Carlos Caballero, the nacionalista
governor of the city of Córdoba, established his own “community council,”
which the liberal media immediately deemed “a preamble for a proper fascist-like
corporative chamber.”131 Still, taken as a whole, there is little evidence that either
Onganía or his Ateneo ministers ever envisioned introducing a truly nationwide
system of public representation in Argentina.132
126. Edmundo J. Carbone, “Una política maniquea,” Cuadernos del Sur 52, November 1968, 999.
127. Roberto Bosca, “Un problema explosivo: La representación política,” Cuadernos del Sur 61-62,
August-September 1969, 680–683.
128. “Expuso el doctor Borda la idea política del gobierno,” La Nación, April 25, 1968, 1; “Declaraciones en Jujuy
del Dr. Díaz Colodrero,” La Nación, May 19, 1968. Ever since 1967, Díaz Colodrero had denied that his ideology was
corporatism, as the latter “political formula” was “a thing of the past.” See “La revolución argentina cumplirá dos
etapas,” ABC (Madrid), June 27, 1967, 72.
129. Formore on these initiatives, see Gabriela Gomes, “El Onganiato y los sectores populares. Funcionarios, ideas
y políticas de la Secretaría de Estado de Promoción y Asistencia a la Comunidad (1966–1970),” Anuario del Centro de
Estudios Históricos 11:11 (2011): 279–302; and Guido Giorgi, “Refundar la sociedad. El comunitarismo como política
de Estado en el Gobierno de Onganía,” in Galván and Osuna, Política y cultura durante el “Onganiato,” 105–118.
130. Onganía, oral history with Potash, 17–18. On CONASE and CONADE, see Aníbal Jáuregui, “El
CONADE: organización y resultados (1961–1971),” Anuario IEHS (2014): 141–158; and Aníbal Jáuregui, “La
planificación en la Argentina: El CONADE y el PND (1960–1966),” Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos 13
(2013): 243–266.
131. “Próximas novedades,” Inédito, August 7, 1968, 5. For more on this episode, see James P. Brennan, Córdoba
rebelde. El Cordobazo, el clasismo y la movilización social (La Plata: De la Campana, 2008), 88–101.
132. Onganía, for his part, denied that these bodies represented a corporatist ideology. See Onganía, oral history
with Potash, 14.
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Even so, the very prospects of inaugurating a “corporatist” political system proved
harmful for Onganía. Indeed, by then, the Argentine press was taking jabs not
only at this forthcoming authoritarian state model but at the ideological groups
propagating it and their unmistakable political influence, in both Onganía’s
administration and provincial governments. This began as early as 1967 when a
damaging report on the Opus Dei’s position of power in government appeared
in the weekly Análisis. “One should consider the Opus Dei a secret/semi-secret
political association and attribute to it an ever-growing, albeit nonvisible,
power,” the report stated.133 In early 1969, Primera Plana followed suit in
exposing the Cursillos de Cristiandad’s political control of Tucumán—a fact
that the province’s non-elected governor and Cursillos leader, Roberto
Avellaneda, hardly denied.134 If these reports reflected the political power of
these movements, rather than their Francoist linkage, then in 1969 several
conspicuous pamphlets circulated in Argentina alleging that the country was
headed toward a “communitarian state” that “will rely on bodies similar to
those existing in Spain and Portugal, under the Opus Dei’s influence.”135 In
brief, by the spring of 1969, Onganía’s regime, the ideological agencies
backing it, and its avowed links to the Iberian peninsula had become subject to
critical public scrutiny.
Ultimately, this public criticism fueled the civil resistance that led to Onganía’s
downfall. On May 29, 1969, a conjuncture of circumstances—including new
tax increases, continuous student mobilization, and the intransigence of several
labor unions gathered under the name CGT de los Argentinos—brought this
unrest to the surface in the city of Córdoba. Following an alliance between the
city’s students and the Light and Auto plant unions, demonstrators took over
the city for hours, to be overrun by the police later on the same day and suffer
up to 30 fatalities.136 The events rendered manifest that Onganía was neither a
consensual dictator nor capable of sustaining “peace and liberty” without lethal
brutality. Furthermore, they bore witness that the regime’s plans to instigate a
conservative modernization reminiscent of Francoism had led Argentines of
133. The report presented Díaz Colodrero, Jorge Mazzighi (sub-director of the Foreign Ministry), and Samuel
Medrano (Ministry of the Interior) as examples of the group’s power. See “El Opus Dei, aquí y ahora,” Análisis
(Buenos Aires), February 6, 1967, 16–20. As mentioned, Inédito also reported regularly on these organizations. See
“Próximas novedades”; and “Opus Dei/Ateneo”.
134. “Tucumán: reino del cursillismo,” Primera Plana, February 4, 1969, 1.
135. Similitud de organismos, AGA, box 42/08972.
136. According to Daniel James, the regime’s determination to control the unions meant a “weakened and divided
union movement,” torn between pragmatism and calls for aggressive opposition. Once the situation in Córdoba escalated,
the Peronist unions joined the mobilization. See James, Resistance and Integration, 220–223. Córdoba was only one of
several uprisings, in the cities of Rosario, Tucumán, and Corrientes, indicating that this was a national uprising rather
than a local outburst of frustration. See Emilio Ariel Crenzel, El Tucumanazo (Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de
Tucumán, 1997); Riz, La política en suspenso, 67–80; Beba Balvé, El ’69 huelga política de masas. Rosariazo, cordobazo,
rosariazo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Contrapunto, 1989).
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different ideological hues to conclude that authoritarianism could be ousted only
through civil disobedience, and later, urban guerilla action. Indeed, even Franco’s
agents reported back to their superiors that Córdoba’s “effervescence” did not
derive from any “political orientation” but from Onganía’s austerity measures
and his reluctance to oppress the public sphere. “Everyone here enjoys the
absolute and total freedom of the press,” they remarked in exhortation.137
Interestingly, Cuadernos del Sur’s response was not dissimilar, as its editorial
admitted that the uprising had resulted from Onganía’s “economic mistakes”
and pleaded that he reveal his “political plan.” But what was the Opus Dei
editors’ desired plan? Certainly not a return to parliamentarism. In truth,
Cuadernos del Sur still argued that the Argentine Revolution had created a final
“supra-constitutional order,” reiterated that the regime relied on a “tacit
consensus of the population,” and ended by stating that “one cannot go back to
the system concluded on June 28, 1966,” since political parties “are unable to
carry out the colossal [economic] task that the country needs.”138 In other
words, even at this dramatic moment, rather than an anticommunist action, the
meta-narrative of authoritarian development was the Opus Dei’s principal
justification for the regime’s continuation.
Onganía struggled to stay in power for another entire year.While using oppressive
measures, which included the closing of several news outlets, he also sacked
the Ateneo ministers, shelved his education reform, and altered somewhat
the course of his economic policies, proving that he was attentive to the
fundamental causes of the “Cordobazo.” And yet, markedly, he refused to
moderate his collaboration with Franco and in January 1970 even sent his new
education minister, Dardo Pérez Guilhou (yet another ICH intellectual), to
meet the Spanish dictator and study Spain’s new education reform.139 Little
did this gesture impress the commanders of the armed forces. Finally, in May
1970, the Azul high command sent Onganía a memorandum blaming him for
“the absence of concrete ideas about the culmination of the revolutionary
process and its exit.”140 Ergo, the armed forces surmised that regardless of its
economic achievements, by utilizing unpopular authoritarian figures and
presenting the public with evasive political schemes, the Argentine Revolution
had reached the limits of its effectiveness. The murder of the general Pedro
Aramburu on May 29, 1970, was yet another grim signal of the dictatorship’s
137. La subversión argentina, AGA, box 42/08972.
138. “Balance de tres años,” Cuadernos del Sur 60, July 1969, 531–533.
139. Pérez Guilhou stated that this reform, also known as the “White Book,” might serve as the basis for
educational reforms “in other countries in the Spanish-speaking community.” See Dardo Pérez Guilhou, oral history
with Robert Potash, 1984, Robert Potash Papers, 8-9/29. See also “Llega el ministro argentino de cultura y
educación,” ABC (Madrid), January 27, 1970, 27.
140. Onganía, oral history with Potash, 25.
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ineptness in the face of left-wing mobilization turning to violence. On June 5,
1970, when the generals demanded that Onganía present the public with a
concrete political plan, he returned to them with a statement of “political
theory” comprising an incoherent mixture of technocratic jargon that ignored
issues such as the separation of powers and the principles of
parliamentarism.141 Three days later, led by Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, the
generals ousted Onganía, paving the way for Juan Perón’s return to power in
1973.
CONCLUSION
The ideological character of the Argentine Revolution has puzzled scholars ever
since Onganía’s downfall in 1970. Overshadowed by the state-led terror of the
second Peronist administration (1973-76) and the Last Dictatorship
(1976-83), Onganía’s authoritarianism brand has been, understandably
perhaps, somewhat overlooked in historiography. Still, this regime was a
decisive chapter in Argentina’s history of political radicalization. Reading
Onganía’s state ideology through the lenses of the dialogue and its links to its
Spanish counterpart allows us to evaluate not only what Onganía and his
followers sought to achieve, but also their perception of the threats and
opportunities of the Cold War international setup. Like Franco before him,
Onganía wanted to initiate an internationally respectable protected society of
material abundance and Catholic spirituality at the heart of the Western
Hemisphere. Herein, he believed, a new post-ideological Argentine subject
could be molded; one who would disdain plebian revolutionary movements, be
they Peronism or Communism. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
political representation was never meant to materialize during the Onganiato,
given that the regime expected the masses to become docile and spiritually
elevated consumers, and, as such, disinterested in politics. In this sense,
Onganía’s dictatorship mirrored technocratic Spain’s narratives and fantasies to
the fullest.
As this article demonstrates, the Argentine-Spanish dialogue became possible
thanks to an intricate network of intellectuals and apparatuses. By offering their
service to Onganía at the right moment, and by continually promoting and
theorizing his regime in the public sphere throughout the 1960s, these agents
ultimately decided the Argentine Revolution’s ideological character. In other
words, Onganía’s state model was not haphazard or improvised but the
outcome of a genealogy of ideological production that led back to the 1930s
141. Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, 298–300.
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and the rise of European fascism. As the correspondences between Amadeo and
Sánchez Bella illustrate, the very essence of the 1930s Hispanidad ideology did
not disappear during the Cold War. Instead, these men readjusted their joint
“Hispanic” spiritual movement against the Enlightenment to the economic,
political, and cultural circumstances of the 1960s. Building on these ties,
Onganía subsequently pursued a special relationship with Franco’s Spain in a
manner that was in no way covert. He and his ministers traveled to Spain, and,
as significantly, Spanish technocrats appeared in Buenos Aires at key moments
in the timeline of the Argentine Revolution, in what became a fruitful dialogue
between two Hispanic technocracies.
Even so, the story of Onganía’s regime was hardly that of Spanish intervention in
Argentine affairs but rather of the former’s misinterpretation of Francoism, and
miscalculation of the popularity of Argentina’s democratic ethos. By believing
his dictatorship could seamlessly implement a handful of “techniques”
employed in Spain at the time, Onganía also grossly overlooked the crucial
importance of the memory of the Spanish Civil War in Spain and Franco’s
ongoing state-led terror. Moreover, the Argentine Revolution’s movement from
rhetoric to action occurred gradually, if not hesitantly, first with an economic
shock treatment, then with the Civic Code and educational reform, and lastly,
with the muddled design of civil participation. A far cry from Franco’s ruthless
methods of government, this meant that Argentina’s civil society had ample
time to grasp this change and react. In brief, Onganía’s downfall resulted from
his self-perception as a consensual leader and unwillingness to murderously
repress civil society—the unspoken ingredient of Franco’s “social peace.” These
lessons have not been lost on the neofascists who were to resurge and overtake
Argentine politics in the 1970s, all of whom readily evoked the legacies of the
Spanish Civil War as they assassinated their allegedly subversive enemies.142
More broadly, examining the predominance of the “Hispanic technocracy” of the
1960s invites a reappraisal of the image of the “inter-American Cold War” as a
dichotomous struggle between local agents of communism and
anticommunism. Sure enough, Onganía was a fierce anticommunist.
Nevertheless, we overlook an entire spectrum of critical ideological phenomena
by merely seeking to identify anticommunist attitudes within the Argentine
right. If the Argentine Revolution’s ideology teaches us anything, it is that, for
its designers, communism was one ill within an array of old and new anxieties.
142. The discourse of “civil war” returned to the center of the Argentine far-right ideology in the 1970s, in
neofascist journals such as El Caudillo and Cabildo, in the face of the activity of Argentina’s revolutionary “urban
guerrilla.” For more on the rise of Argentina’s neofascist movements in the wake of Onganía’s downfall, see Daniel
Gunnar Kressel, “Technicians of the Spirit: Post-Fascist Technocratic Authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina, and Chile,
1945–1988” (PhD diss.: Columbia University, 2019), 300–324.
116 DANIEL G. KRESSEL
Symptomatic of their time and place, Onganía and his technocrats fretted over the
prospects of lagging behind the West in a new era of economic expansion, as well
as over Western cultural trends they deemed detrimental to the Hispanic social
and spiritual essence. Thus, exploring how Argentines looked to Spain for
ideological guidance and symbolic ratification opens a host of new questions
regarding the nature of the Spanish and Argentine anti-US mindset, and their
reciprocal nostalgia for the lost Spanish Empire. After all, as the self-proclaimed
custodians of Latin America’s “Hispanic truth,” Franco, Onganía, and their
ideologues envisioned their sui generis version of modernity as soon to inform,
if not unify, the entire Spanish speaking world.
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